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Abstract  
 The existence of operational inefficiency in the U.S. airline industry, combined with 
rising costs and financial problems, has long prompted airlines to find ways to consolidate 
through mergers, and to cooperate through codeshare agreements and alliances. While the price 
and competition effects of mergers and codeshare agreements are well documented by existing 
research, there is comparatively little literature over a merger’s impact on the codeshare products 
between the merging firms, and on markets abundant in codeshare passengers. This paper seeks 
to fill this research gap by analyzing price data for 75 million passengers from four consecutive 
quarters before and four consecutive quarters after the United-Continental Airline merger. The 
results show a statistically significant price increase in former codeshare products in markets, 
and a statistically significant price decrease for codeshare products in highly concentrated 
markets. The data also shows a statistically significant price increase for non-concentrated 
markets that are abundant in codeshare passengers, and a statistically significant price decrease 
highly concentrated markets that are abundant in codeshare passengers. These findings indicate 
that antitrust authorities should pay more attention to markets that aren’t concentrated when 
making future merger decisions, particularly as the number of passengers taking advantage of 
codeshare tickets continues to increase. 
[4] 
 
1. Introduction 
 While airline mergers have long been a hallmark feature of the airline industry since it 
was deregulated in 1978, the mergers that have taken place over the past 6 years – Delta & 
Northwest Airlines (2008), United & Continental Airlines (2010), and US Airways & American 
Airlines (2013) – amount to an especially significant consolidation of the U.S. airline industry. A 
study using data from the U.S. Department of Transportation found that the recently-approved 
US Airways – American Airline merger would cause 75% of the domestic market to be 
dominated by just 3 airlines – half the number of airlines holding this market share just 10 years 
ago.
1
 This level of consolidation means that airlines frequently overtake each other as the largest 
airline after each merger. United Airlines is currently the world’s largest airline in terms of 
passenger-revenue miles, having overtaken Delta Airlines in 2011 following the 2010 United-
Continental merger. Delta Airlines was previously the world’s largest airline because of its 2008 
merger with Northwest Airlines.
2
 American Airlines is expected to overtake United Airlines after 
it has operationally integrated with U.S. Airways.
3
 This level of consolidation has resulted in 
greater market concentration, and the data shows that market concentration increased by an 
average of 12 percent across all city markets between the pre- and post-merger periods of the 
United-Continental Airline merger. 
 Mergers have been sought after by many airlines because they present the opportunity for 
greater operational efficiency. Among other benefits, they enlarge the number of destinations 
                                                          
1 Rowell, David. “The Collapse of Airline Competition – A Visual Analysis.” The Travel Insider. 7 Mar 
2013. http://blog.thetravelinsider.info/2013/03/the-collapse-of-airline-competition-a-visual-analysis.html  
2 “United ends 2011 as world's largest airline as Emirates encroaches on the number three spot.” Centre for 
Aviation. 9 Dec 2011. http://centreforaviation.com/blogs/aviation-blog/united-ends-2011-as-worlds-
largest-airline-as-emirates-encroaches-on-the-number-three-spot-64324  
3 Martin, Hugo. “American Airlines – US Airways Merger Formally Announced.” The Los Angeles Times. 
14 Feb 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/14/business/la-fi-mo-american-us-airways-merger-
announced-20130214  
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reached by the airline and increased the frequency of flights between destinations, all without 
requiring additional investment. In addition, they allow the airlines to streamline their operations 
in a more flexible and cost-effective manner as they struggle to deal with cost-related issues from 
high fuel prices and salaries (Carbaugh and Ghosh 2010). These high costs, combined with 
relatively limited demand and competition from low-cost carriers, have posed challenges for 
airlines trying to maintain profitability, and the four largest U.S. legacy carriers– US Airways, 
American Airlines, United Airlines and Delta Airlines – were all forced to declare bankruptcy at 
some point over the past 15 years. Airlines that have merged have been more profitable, and 
many have argued that the increased efficiency and profitability that result from mergers will be 
passed on to consumers through lower prices and better efficiency.  
 However, there are concerns that such horizontal mergers, which decrease competition, 
can increase the market power of the newly merged airline, resulting in price increases and a 
drop in consumer welfare. Previous studies, such as Beautel and McBride (1992) and Kwoka and 
Shumilkina (2010) have found that the greatest price effects are likely to be felt on flights 
between cities where both merging airlines used to hold substantial market power and were the 
main competitors, and in cities where the market share of the merging airline is high and there 
are barriers to entry for other airlines. Moreover, the fact that a very small number of airlines 
dominate most of the industry could change the manner in which they compete against each 
other, and has the potential to undermine competition altogether. Decisions to allow a merger at 
a given point in time can potentially encourage future mergers within the industry, as airlines 
often see mergers as a way of remaining competitive with their newly-merged competitors. It 
also becomes challenging for antitrust authorities to deny a future merger after having already 
approved a similar one in the past. Airlines are more likely to engage in anticompetitive and 
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exploitative behavior when there is significant market concentration, and when potential 
competitors face barriers to entry (some of which can be erected by firms that control the 
market). While consolidation may have not yielded significant price increases for many previous 
mergers, questions have been raised as to how much longer this can hold as the number of 
competitors continues to dwindle.  
 The potential benefits and drawbacks of mergers are weighed by the U.S. Department of 
Justice when it reviews airline mergers. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers that substantially 
reduce competition or create monopolies, and federal authorities are tasked with carefully 
analyzing the potential effects of mergers to prevent those that might violate this law. In recent 
years, the Department of Justice has tended to permit mergers if the merging airlines agree to 
exchange their slots at populous and concentrated airports. The government agreed not to contest 
the United-Continental Airline merger after Continental Airlines agreed to lease 18 slots at 
Newark Liberty International Airport (a major hub for both United and Continental Airlines) to 
Southwest Airlines. The Department of Justice later took a similar approach in 2013 to the U.S. 
Airways – American Airlines merger, when it dropped its antitrust lawsuit after the merging 
airlines agreed to give slots at Washington Reagan National Airport (a U.S. Airways hub) to 
Southwest Airlines. 
 The other dimension that has relevance to the United-Continental Airline merger is the 
fact that United and Continental Airlines had a codeshare agreement for two years prior to their 
merger. This agreement effectively allowed both airlines to sell seats on each other’s flights and 
cross-honor membership in frequent-flyer programs. While previous research has found 
codeshare agreements to decrease prices, particularly when the codesharing airlines are 
competing against each other on a given aircraft for the most price-sensitive passengers, it is not 
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immediately clear that this is the case among all codeshare agreements, and between all city 
pairs. Concerns have been raised over the impact of such agreements on the prices of itineraries 
between hubs of the partners, as well as the use of agreements that allow unfettered sales of seats 
on the planes of partners.
4
 Moreover, while codeshare agreements offer consumers many of the 
advantages that mergers provide, they also have drawbacks similar to those outlined. Unlike 
mergers, codeshare agreements do not need prior approval, although the U.S. Department of 
Transportation reviews major codeshare agreements to guard against unapproved cooperation 
between the airlines involved. 
 While codeshare agreements and mergers parallel each other in some of their benefits and 
drawbacks, there are some tradeoffs between each of them. On the one hand, codeshare 
agreements have the potential to be more anticompetitive than mergers because they are attract 
less scrutiny than antitrust authorities, and because the cost of implementing a codeshare 
agreement is substantially lower than the cost of merging. On the other hand, codeshare 
agreements do not allow cooperating airlines to capture the type of market power that is possible 
with a merger. As a result of this tradeoff, it is not immediately clear whether codeshare 
agreements are more anticompetitive than mergers. While mergers are traditionally believed to 
be have greater potential for anticompetitive behavior than codeshare agreements, it could be the 
case that diminished enforcement enables codeshare airlines to take greater advantage of their 
market power gains than would be possible with a merger. The overall effects cannot be solely 
determined using a theoretical framework; an empirical analysis is needed to identify how the 
competing effects balance when a codeshare arrangement is replaced with a merger. 
                                                          
4 Leandro, Solange and Ruttley, Philippe. “European Union: Code Sharing Come under Commission 
Scrutiny.” Mondaq. 12 July 2012. 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/186372/Aviation/Code+Shares+Come+Under+The+Commissions+Scrutiny 
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 A preliminary look at the data suggests some reasons to be concerned about the effects of 
the United-Continental Airline merger. Between the four months preceding the merger and four 
months after the merger, the average market experienced a 21.02% increase in prices. Markets 
dominated by United and Continental Airlines (where more than 80% of passengers flew on 
either airline) experienced an average price increase of 27.8%. Although the average price 
change was the same for markets ticketed by both United and Continental Airlines and markets 
lacking a joint presence, the median price change was a 19.49% increase in joint-ticketed 
markets (compared to a 13.54% increase in markets lacking such a joint presence). Markets with 
United/Continental codeshare products also experienced a greater median increase in prices 
(18.85%) than those lacking codeshare products (11.41%).  
 The goal of this paper is to contribute to recent literature that evaluates the mergers. 
While there have been several papers which examine the anticipated price effects, there are 
relatively few papers that have looked at the effect of a merger on both the fares in markets 
where codeshare itineraries exist, and on the price of products. To my knowledge, this would be 
the first paper to evaluate the impact of the United-Continental merger on codeshare itineraries, 
and to analyze the role that pre-merger market concentration plays in the merger’s effect on 
codeshare itineraries. This would likely be the first paper to evaluate a merger’s effects on 
codeshare products by using actual pre- and post-merger data. 
The information yielded by this analysis is likely to be of relevance to the Department of 
Justice in its review of future mergers, since it sheds light on the empirical effects that a merger 
might have on cooperative ventures between merging firms. These effects are likely to increase 
in magnitude as more passengers take advantage of the lower prices that codeshare agreements 
offer. A close look at these effects can provide insight into markets that are most likely to 
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experience adverse effects, and this information can be used to direct the type of remedial action 
that the Department of Justice can require of merging firms. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 Many intuitions and aspects surrounding the questions posed in this paper, and the 
econometric methods used to answer these questions, stem from previous research.  Hence, a 
review of relevant literature is provided individually for mergers and codesharing, as well as for 
previous attempts to understand the effects of mergers on codeshare agreements. 
 
MERGERS 
 Ever since the airline industry was deregulated in the late 1970s, the number of airlines 
competing against each has fallen as many airlines have found that it is often inefficient and 
unprofitable to operate alone. This has led to the rise of mergers and other forms of cooperative 
arrangements, such as codeshare agreements, antitrust immunity, and alliances. Beutel and 
McBride (1992) point out that, among other effects, mergers allowed airlines to create hub-and-
spoke systems of air travel, thus increasing efficiency by allowing airlines to expand their 
networks in a more cost effective manner, and also ensuring that more seats were likely to be 
purchased on each flight. At the same time, Beutel and McBride notes that mergers also led to 
increased market concentration, both due to the smaller number of competing firms and also due 
to the fact that airlines were able to dominate in markets to and from their hubs.  
 Citing these effects, Beautel and McBride sought to clarify the effect of carrier market 
power on post-merger fares, arguing that it is the increase of the carrier’s market power that will 
determine whether or not the airline might have anticompetitive effects. Using the Northwest-
[10] 
 
Republic Airline merger, the paper used pre-merger data to estimate the market power effects at 
one of their hubs. The paper found that the merger would increase the market power of Republic 
Airlines at the airport, and that the ability of Northwest Airlines to set fares would decrease. 
 Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) further explored the potential competition effects by 
evaluating the fare impact in cases where a merging firm was, as a result of the merger, able to 
prevent its partner firm from entering markets that it was capable of entering. It found that in the 
case of the US Airways (then known as USAir) and Piedmont Airline merger – a merger which 
had plenty of entrance opportunities for both merging firms, according to the authors – fares 
increased by 5 to 6 percent in such cases of blocked competition, and that the fare increase was 
greater on routes where both firms had actually competed prior to the merger.   
 Morrison (1996) also evaluated the USAir and Piedmont Airline merger, in addition to 
two other mergers, but instead used data for a much longer time span (7 years before the merger 
and 8 years after the merger), and found that while the mergers did decrease competition on 
many routes, any price increases caused by them in the short run tended to lessen in the long-run, 
and mergers tended to yield positive benefits overall (with the notable exception of the US 
Airways and Piedmont Airlines merger, arguably for the reasons outlined in Kwoka and 
Shumilkina (2010)). This result is noteworthy since it shows that the true impact of a merger, 
including the United-Continental Airline merger, may not necessarily be known for years to 
come. That being said, Morrison (1996) does acknowledge that it is difficult to attribute long-run 
data to the merger itself, given that plenty of time would have elapsed since the merger and 
events unrelated to the merger may have transpired. 
 Based on the literature presented so far, and the merger literature that will be presented 
later in this paper, it is clear that while mergers can lower prices due to improved efficiency, 
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price increases may also be experienced in certain markets, particularly where the merging 
airlines used to compete, where they are now barred from competing, and where it is difficult for 
other airlines to enter. These differentiated effects mean that a merger analysis will have to 
incorporate some variables to understand the level of competition in a given market and for a 
given product in order to understand how the merger might influence some markets and some 
products differently.  
 It is finally worth noting the distinction in how mergers have been analyzed. Beautel and 
McBride (1992) analyzed mergers by conducting merger simulations. This method involves 
preparing a supply and demand model to predict firm and market behavior. The method also 
might involve a counterfactual study (i.e. to see what would happen if the merger did not occur). 
Peters (2006) conducted an analysis to examine merger simulation methods commonly used. In 
his analysis, he used pre-merger data to predict the price effects of five mergers that occurred 
from 1986-1987 (including those evaluated by the papers mentioned earlier), and compared the 
predicted effects under standard simulation methods with the actual post-merger data effects, 
finding that standard models are generally inaccurate in their merger predictions. He argued that 
more flexible models of firm conduct should be incorporated into models analyzing mergers, 
since deviations from the conduct that is presumed under the standard models accounted for the 
largest differences between estimated and actual post-merger data.  
 Following Morrison (1996) & Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010), this paper will not 
incorporate a theoretical model, and will instead consist of a before-and-after analysis by 
analyzing both post-merger data and pre-merger data. This method has the benefit of allowing 
the actual effects of the merger to be examined, as opposed to the predicted effects. Although 
such data only emerges after a merger has taken place, the analysis is nevertheless still valuable 
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in providing insight for antitrust authorities in the process of approving future mergers, as well as 
in critiquing any theoretical pre-merger analyses which may have been conducted. 
  
CODESHARING 
 Over the past 15 years, codesharing and codeshare alliances have greatly increased in 
prevalence, sparking interest into their competitive effects. Most literature evaluating them 
initially focused on codeshare agreements in international markets, and there was plenty of 
evidence to suggest that such arrangements were beneficial. Brueckner (2003) evaluated the 
effect of cooperative measures, such as codesharing and antitrust immunity (a government-
endorsed arrangement which allows airlines to collaborate in setting prices on international 
trips), on airline fares, finding that both cooperative measures resulted in fare decreases, although 
the decrease was smaller when both were combined. This cross-sectional study was expanded in 
Whalen (2007), which conducted a panel data analysis on this question and found that the price 
difference, while lower in markets with cooperation, was not as great as that found under a cross-
sectional study of this question. 
The lower prices on international codeshare agreements have been frequently attributed 
to the elimination of double-marginalization that would ordinarily exist when two different 
airlines were setting prices independently for separate portions of the same trip. As a result, it has 
been assumed that codeshare agreements led to greater product efficiency, and the benefits of 
these were passed down in the form of consumer benefits. This assumption was challenged by 
Chen and Gayle (2007), which found that double marginalization was not eliminated in markets 
where each codeshare partner was competing against each other.  
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 In recent years, literature has emerged on the changing nature of codeshare agreements. 
While codeshare agreements traditionally involved flying on a flight operated by the ticketing 
airline for a portion of the trip, newer codeshare agreements meant that it was possible to never 
travel on a flight operated by the ticketing airline. This was because traditional codeshare 
agreements always involved a layover, while the “virtual” agreements did not necessarily 
involve one (Ito and Lee (2007) claims that the vast majority do not). As a result of this 
development, it was not clear whether the benefits of codeshare agreements, such as the 
elimination of double-marginalization actually applied to the virtual agreements. In spite of this, 
Ito and Lee (2007) found that virtual codeshare itineraries had lower prices than itineraries that 
were operated by the ticketing airline (i.e. “online” trips). They concluded by stating that 
codeshare agreements may be used by airlines as a mechanism to compete for passengers on a 
given operating flight. Moreover, since passengers travelling with a codeshare ticket are often 
ineligible for certain travel perks that are extended to those travelling on a flight operated by the 
ticketing carrier, such as free upgrades, codeshare products are often regarded as an inferior 
product. 
 Given that United and Continental Airlines had a codeshare agreement for two years 
prior to their merger – the agreement was signed in June 2008 – and given that codeshare 
products are deemed to be inferior to online products, the question over how their prices will 
change subsequent to a merger is raised, as is the question over how the change will be different 
from that of an online product. The research in this paper will primarily focus on virtual 
codesharing, rather than traditional codesharing, since virtual codesharing is more prevalent in 
the domestic airline industry. 
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MERGERS, ALLIANCES, AND CODESHARING 
 The question of how codeshare agreements are influenced by the merger of the partner 
airlines was first raised and explored by Brown (2010), which conducted a series of 
counterfactual experiments (measuring varying degrees of possible efficiency gains) to analyze 
the anticipated effect of the Delta – Northwest Airline merger, based on demand estimates that 
were determined using pre-merger data, as well as product-level marginal costs that were 
determined based on these demand estimates and by assuming price-setting behavior. Like the 
United-Continental merger, the Delta- Northwest Airline merger also involved two airlines that 
had a codeshare agreement with each other. Unlike other papers, which have tended to look only 
at city-market pairs, Brown (2010) also looked at products, which were specific by origin, 
destination, operating airline, ticketing airline, and number of stops, as well as the price effect of 
changes in codeshare arrangements (or lack of such changes).   
 Ultimately, Brown (2010) found that price increases would be largely contained in 
markets with high concentration of Delta and Northwest Airlines, as well as on Delta & 
Northwest Airline products. It also found that Delta-Northwest codeshare products would likely 
have a higher price increase than online products, and that codeshare products which become 
online products will have a higher price increase than codeshare products that do not change 
after the merger. Brown (2010) attributed these results to the fact that codeshare products tend to 
cost less than their online counterparts, and therefore would see a larger price increase (when 
they become online) than online products which remain online after the merger. Brown (2010) 
also noted that the fact that the elimination (or reduction) of codeshare opportunities which 
accompanies mergers might reduce competition on a given flight and in a given market, thus 
making it more profitable for airlines to raise fares on those respective flights and markets. 
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 In a more recent paper, Luo (2013) attempted to further explore the question raised by 
Brown (2010) with pre- and post-merger data for the Delta – Northwest Airline merger, but only 
on a city-market level. Luo (2013) conducted a series of difference-in-differences regressions of 
the price changes against variables accounting for changes in the markets between the pre- and 
post-merger periods, such as changes in the numbers of legacy and low-cost carrier and dummy 
variables accounting for changes in the presence of Delta and Northwest Airlines. Ultimately, 
Luo (2013) found that the merger would generate statistically significant (albeit small) price 
increases across city markets, and that these increases were especially high in markets with high 
Delta – Northwest Airline concentration. In addition to evaluating the effects of the merger, Luo 
(2013) also separately evaluated the changes in prices in markets that formerly contained 
codeshare products between Delta and Northwest Airlines, but subsequently only contain Delta 
Airlines. The research findings in Luo’s paper indicate that fares in these markets rose by a 
greater amount than in all markets containing both Delta & Northwest Airlines prior to the 
merger and only Delta Airlines after the merger. 
 While the results of Luo (2013) address merger-induced market fare changes to see how 
they vary based on the presence of Delta-Northwest codeshare products in those markets, they do 
not look at the merger’s impact on such products themselves. The study does conduct a 
disaggregated analysis to see how Delta/Northwest Airline fares are changed by market-specific 
variables, but the analysis does not account for any product specific variables.  
 The econometric methods that will be used in this paper are adopted in part from 
Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2004), which explored the effect of the two airline alliances 
on price and competition effects. These methods were later used in Gayle (2008) in evaluating 
the Delta-Continental-Northwest Airline alliance. In constructing the model, Bamberger, 
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Carlton, and Neumann (2004) used a dependent variable involving the natural logarithm of the 
new price divided by the old price. The paper notes that such a definition controls for specific 
effects that do not vary by time. Although the paper does not point this out, it also appears that 
this definition would also control for price variations that do vary by time, but affect all markets 
equally, such as inflation and rising fixed costs. On of the explanatory variables used by 
Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2004) was market concentration, as determined through the 
Herfindahl-Herschman Index. The paper also looked at the change in the proportion of 
passengers flying in non-alliance airlines, and the change in market concentration of non-
merging airlines. The intuition behind looking at non-merging airlines, the paper points out, is to 
reduce potential endogeneity that may result if the changes were evaluated using the merging 
airlines instead. In deciding to adopt this methodology, Gayle (2008) clarifies that these 
endogeneity problems occur due to the possibility that both passenger preference and thus 
market concentration could be influenced by one of the alliance airlines simply being more 
effective than others in a given market. Both studies found that the domestic alliances resulted in 
declining airline fares and had yielded other consumer benefits (such as air traffic increases). 
 The econometric model used by Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2004) and Gayle 
(2008) has yet to be applied specifically to a merger. Given that mergers also involve a supposed 
tradeoff between improved product efficiency and reduced competition, it would make sense for 
this econometric method to be applied to this scenario. However, this paper will adapt those 
methods in order to control for fare changes that might be caused by non-market changes. 
Moreover, since the method was used in both papers to analyze changes at the market-level, it 
will have to be further modified in order to analyze changes at the product level.  
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3. Data 
 The data is gathered from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 
10% sample of all flight itineraries nationwide and is provided to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation directly by airlines on a quarterly basis.
5
 The data consists of the trip fare, origin, 
destination, distance travelled, number of passengers, operating carrier, and ticketing carrier. 
The United-Continental merger was publically announced on May 3, 2010. After it was 
approved by the U.S. Department of Justice in August 2010 and by shareholders of both 
companies in September 2010, the acquisition was finalized in October 2010. However, the 
airlines were not fully integrated in their ticketing and operational capacity until March 2012. 
Therefore, the pre-merger data will consist of the 4
th
 quarter data of 2009, and the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
quarter data of 2010. The post-merger data will consist of the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 quarter data of 2012, 
and the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 quarter data of 2013. The purpose of combining four consecutive quarters of 
data in each data period is to ensure that typical seasonal fluctuations in prices and product 
offerings are accounted for. A two-year separation between pre- and post-merger periods is used 
to account for the time necessary to achieve full operational integration. Many studies evaluating 
airline mergers and alliances with pre- and post-merger data (Luo, 2013; Bamberger, Carlton and 
Neumann, 2004; and Peter, 2006) also allow approximately 1-2 years between their pre- and 
post-merger time periods.  
 The data was originally presented as a list of market itineraries, which consist of 
transactional details of the entire trip purchased by an individual. Trips with layovers were 
placed in the same market as trips without them, but trips that truncated in the middle were 
recorded in each separate market, based on truncation. For example, a round trip between New 
York and Los Angeles would be recorded in two markets; once from New York to Los Angles 
                                                          
5 Data is available at http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Tables.asp?DB_ID=125  
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and once from Los Angeles to New York. If the fare was paid in bulk for trips with multiple 
truncations, the fare paid for each truncated trip was recorded in proportion to the relative 
distance of that trip. If $500 was paid for a round trip between New York and Los Angeles, the 
data will indicate that $250 was paid in each market. If there were multiple passengers flying on 
the trip, the total amount paid was divided by the number of passengers. 
 The analysis in this paper was conducted on both a market and product level. A market 
consists of an origin and a destination city pair, and is direction-specific. Data for cities located 
in metropolitan areas with multiple airports were combined, since the presence of nearby airports 
can influence a buyer’s decision in choosing flights. For example, since Baltimore, MD and 
Washington, DC are part of the same combined statistical area, data for airports serving both 
cities are combined and they are treated as one city. Products consist of specific ticketing and 
operating carriers, and specific number of layovers, operating within a specified origin and 
destination pair. Itineraries were aggregated into products, and products were aggregated into 
city markets. 
In order to ensure that the analysis could proceed with minimal complication, several 
observations, markets, and products were dropped. All itineraries with market fares that are less 
than $25 were dropped because of the increased possibility that alternative means of purchasing 
the tickets, such as frequent flyer miles, were used. Itineraries that were ticketed or operated by 
either foreign airlines or more than one airline are dropped. Itineraries that were ticketed by very 
small carriers (ones that did not issue at least 500 tickets in at least one data period) were 
dropped in order to exclude airlines that may not exist to actively compete with most commercial 
carriers. As a result, the analysis was restricted to the 19 largest ticketing carriers (or 97% of all 
ticketed passengers). Operating carriers that were subsidiaries or sole operators of a ticketing 
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carrier were recoded to match that ticketing carrier. At the city market level, all city markets (and 
products within those city markets) lacking a United or Continental Airline presence either 
before or after the merger, but not both before and after the merger, were dropped. This was to 
avoid endogeneity problems that might arise if the market gains or loses a United or Continental 
Airline presence between the data periods. Moreover, this ensured that markets lacking a United 
or Continental Airline presence in both time periods would still be included, effectively allowing 
them to act as control observations. All products located in dropped city markets were likewise 
dropped from the product-level analysis. Furthermore, products that did not appear both before 
and after the merger were dropped. 
 In analyzing the effect of the merger on the prices of products, a notable problem arose: 
the Continental Airline products that this paper intends to study would disappear after the 
merger, due to the disappearance of flights that are ticketed or operated by Continental Airlines. 
Therefore, the United Airline equivalence of these products after the merger were paired with the 
products operated by Continental Airlines before the merger for the before-and-after regression, 
under the theory that flights formerly operated by Continental Airlines would be combined with 
United Airlines operations after the merger. Flights ticketed by Continental Airlines but operated 
on an airline other than United Airlines were dropped.  
 
 
VARIABLES 
Given the inherently complex and seemingly incomprehensible pricing mechanism used 
by airlines, the lack of data on all factors that influences prices, and the amount of variation in 
supply and demand pricing factors that are present among different airlines, itineraries, products, 
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and markets, it would be nearly impossible to devise an econometric model that can explain 
much of the pricing variation. No prior research in this field has succeeded at doing so, and this 
paper is unlikely to be the first to do this. That said, this paper incorporates as many relevant 
supply and demand factors as possible while attempting to avoid endogeneity problems 
associated with the inclusion of certain variables. Fortunately, much of the variation that exists in 
both time periods was differenced out by virtue of the econometric methods used. Also, the price 
definition used accounts for changes that affect all markets equally (for example, inflation). As a 
result, it is the variation in changes between time periods or within only one of the time periods 
that risks not being accounted for. Ultimately, the presence of unexplained variation is not 
expected to undermine the results.  
The data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey was used to construct a variable 
to detect for the presence of either United or Continental Airlines in both time periods, and a 
variable to detect for the joint presence of United and Continental Airlines before the merger. 
Since the United-Continental Airline merger was among the most significant of aviation events 
during the time period between the data sets, these variables were necessary to capture the effects 
of the merger as differentiated by firm participation in the market. In the product-level only, a 
series of variables were created to indicate whether the merging firms operated or ticketed the 
product. A codeshare dummy variable was constructed for each passenger travelling on flights 
that were ticketed by United Airlines and operated by Continental Airlines, or on flights that 
were ticketed by Continental Airlines and operated by United Airlines. This variable was used to 
identify formerly codeshare products in the product-analysis. A separate proportion variable was 
used in both the market and product analysis to indicate the percent of passengers travelling on 
such a ticket. A market concentration variable was created by adding the squared passenger 
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proportion of each market participant (in effect, calculating the Herfindahl-Herschman Index). 
Endogeneity was controlled for by separately calculating the change in non United-Continental 
Airline market concentration, and the change in the proportion of non United-Continental Airline 
passengers. The values for both variables were recoded to 0 in markets completely dominated by 
United or Continental Airlines in both time periods. 
The dependent variable in both the market and product models was the natural logarithm 
of the post-merger price divided by the pre-merger price. The intuition behind using this method 
was to control for price changes likely to affect all markets, such as inflation and industry-wide 
shocks. The price in each data period was determined by calculating the total revenue yielded by 
each market/product, and dividing this by the number of passengers in that market/product.  
In order to account for extraneous variables that might influence demand changes for 
products and markets, population and income data for city markets was collected respectively 
from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data was collected 
on four levels in decreasing order: Combined Statistical Area, Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
Micropolitan Statistical Area, and county. Each city market was paired with the highest level of 
data available to that market. City markets located in multiple statistical areas or counties (at the 
highest level of available data) were paired with the highest-level data of the most populous 
statistical area or county in that area. The 2010 data was used for the pre-merger period, and the 
2012 data for the post-merger period. For each data period, the origin and destination data of 
each market were averaged, and the percent change of these averages was calculated.  
Data on the price of fuel per distance was collected in order to account for potential 
supply changes for products and markets.  According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
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the cost of domestic airline fuel was $2.27 per gallon in 2010, and $3.18 per gallon in 2012.
6
 The 
difference in the cost of fuel between the data periods (or 91 cents) was multiplied by the 
distance between each city pair to determine the change in fuel cost associated with each market 
in each data period (assuming that each airplane consumes a roughly equivalent amount of 
gallons per mile). 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 The summary statistics for the variables used in estimation are shown in Table 1. Most 
markets experienced an increase in their average prices between the pre- and post-merger data 
periods. The average prices increased from $292.23 to $333.33, reflecting a 21.02% increase. 
Figure 1 shows that the logarithm of the price distribution is well approximated by a normal 
distribution during both merger periods. Although the average price change was the same for 
markets ticketed by both United and Continental Airlines and markets lacking a joint presence, 
the median price change was a 19.49% increase in joint-ticketed markets (compared to a 13.54% 
increase in markets lacking such a joint presence). Markets with United/Continental codeshare 
products also experienced a greater median increase in prices (18.85%) than those lacking 
codeshare products (11.41%). A similar disparity can be observed in market concentration 
changes. While markets lacking a joint presence of United and Continental Airlines prior to the 
merger experienced an average 11% increase in market concentration, markets with such a joint 
presence saw an average 14% increase, and markets with United/Continental codeshare products 
saw an average 13% increase.
7
 
                                                          
6 “Airline Fuel Cost and Consumption (U.S. Carriers – Scheduled).” Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/fuel.asp  
7 Statistics for the joint presence of United and Continental Airlines, or for the presence of United-
Continental codeshare products, are not reflected in Table 1. 
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 While these statistics do not necessarily indicate that the merger was responsible for these 
disparities, it suggests that it is certainly advantageous to better understand the source of these 
disparities. 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the natural logarithm of prices. While the distribution remained 
unchanged in the post-merger period, the average price increased and the variance decreased. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
        
 
Mean/ 
Value St. Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
Markets (49625 total)               
Pre-merger Market Price (in USD) 295.23 128.24 25 219.58 270.58 336.50 6686.75 
Post-merger Market Price (in USD) 333.33 126.98 25.09 260.71 311.76 372.92 4999.44 
Pre-merger HHI 0.70 0.27 0.134 0.48 0.67 1 1 
Post-merger HHI 0.75 0.26 0.161 0.50 0.82 1 1 
Pre-merger City Income (in USD) 37498.04 6854.91 21519 33250 36510 40697 71691 
Post-merger City Income (in USD) 41094.51 8884.59 22400 35743 39505 44321 116978 
Pre-merger City Population 670570 1628288 660 65770 187771 521454 196000000 
Post-merger City Population 683190 1657036 668 65784 190471 529141 198000000 
Change in Cost of Fuel X Market Distance 1335.48 860.65 16.45 729.44 1108.26 1740.90 5186.92 
Percent of UA/CO Codeshare Passengers in UA/CO 
Markets 0.257 
      Percent of markets with UA/CO presence 60.39 
      Percent of UA/CO Joint Markets, pre-merger 15.08 
      Percent of markets with UA/CO codeshare products 6.35 
              
Products (74750 total)               
Pre-merger Product Price (in USD) 266.67 303.66 184.19 234.86 309.39 25.06 50029.22 
Post-merger Product Price (in USD) 306.92 144.47 221.63 279.90 355.301 25.30 9999 
Percent of UA/CO ticketed products 35.35             
Percent of UA/CO codeshare products 3.94             
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4. Econometric Model 
 The goal of the paper is two-part: to evaluate the merger’s impact on markets that are 
abundant in United/Continental Airline codeshare products, and to evaluate the merger’s impact 
on those products themselves. Since this paper evaluates both markets and products, two 
different OLS econometric models were used in this analysis. The analysis looks at merger-
related price changes, so a modified version of a difference-in-differences regression was used. 
The models are based on the one used by Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann (2004) and Gayle 
(2008), although they are modified to include codeshare variables, as well as supply and demand 
factors. 
The dependent variable used in both the market and the product-level analysis will be the 
natural logarithm of the average price in the market or product after the merger divided by the 
average price in that market or product prior to the merger. As explained earlier, the goal of this 
definition is to remove variation that might affect the prices of all markets and products. 
 The econometric models used for markets and products are shown below. An explanation 
of each variable is shown in Table 2. 
Equation 1: Markets 
  
               
               
                                             
                                                                                               
                                                           
 
 
 Equation 2: Products 
          
                
                
                                             
                                                                                         
                                                                                 )+  
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Most of the variables in Equation 2 are the same as those from Equation 1, since changes 
in market-level characteristics are likely to play a significant role in product price changes. The 
disaggregated nature of Equation 2 means that the merger’s effects can be observed on an even 
more localized level than in Equation 1; variables accounting for the nature of each product are 
included in Equation 2. 
In order to detect for potential heterogeneous effects, I interacted all of the market and 
product presence variables with the HHI, and all of the market presence variables with the 
codeshare proportion variable. I also included an interaction between the codeshare proportion 
and HHI variables in order to check for heterogeneity in the codeshare proportion variable.
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Table 2. Variable Description 
 
Variable Variable Name Description 
x1 UA/CO Presence This is a dummy variable that will equal 1 if at least one of the 
merging airlines is present in both the pre-merger and post-merger 
data periods  
 
x2 Proportion of UA/CO 
Codeshare Passengers 
This represents the proportion of passengers in the pre-merger period 
who are traveling on a flight that is either operated by United 
Airlines and ticketed by Continental Airlines, or is operated by 
United Airlines and ticketed by Continental Airlines.  
 
x3 Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) 
This is the sum of each firm’s pre-merger market share (percentage 
of total market passengers on a flight ticketed by that firm), squared. 
The number can range from zero to one 
 
x4 Joint UA/CO Presence This is a dummy variable that will equal 1 if both United and 
Continental Airlines are ticketing carriers in the pre-merger market  
 
x5 Change in non UA/CO 
passengers 
This is the percent change (between the pre-merger and post-merger 
time periods) in the proportion of passengers ticketed on an airline 
other than United or Continental Airlines in that market. 
 
x6 Change in non UA/CO 
HHI 
This is the change in the market concentration between the pre- and 
post-merger periods. For this calculation, United and Continental 
Airlines are excluded. 
 
x7 Change in Income This is the percent change in the average per capita income of both 
the origin and destination metropolitan areas between 2010 and 
2012. 
 
x8 Change in Population This is the percent change in the average population of both the 
origin and destination metropolitan areas between 2010 and 2012. 
 
x9 Change in Fuel Cost * 
Distance 
This is the distance (in miles) between the origin and destination 
multiplied by the change in the cost of fuel per gallon between 2010 
and 2012. 
 
x10 UA/CO Ticket This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the product is ticketed 
by either United or Continental Airlines 
 
x11 UA/CO codeshare ticket This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if, in the pre-merger 
period, the product was either (1) ticketed by Continental Airlines 
and operated by United Airlines, or is (2) ticketed by United Airlines 
and operated by Continental Airlines. 
 
x12 CO Ticketed This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if Continental Airlines 
ticketed the product in the pre-merger period. 
 
x13 CO Operated This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if Continental Airlines 
operated the product in the pre-merger period. 
 
x14 UA Operated This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if United Airlines 
operated the product in the pre-merger period. 
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5. Estimation Results 
 
The dataset – consisting of 75 million passengers in both data periods – was aggregated 
into 49,625 city markets, and a series of OLS regressions were run. The estimates are shown in 
Table 3. When I regressed the proportion of codeshare passengers alone (specification 1), the 
resulting coefficient was very small and lacked statistical significance. However, the variable 
gained statistical significance when I incorporated variables pertaining to market concentration 
and United/Continental Airline presence (specification 2). When I interacted the codeshare 
proportion with the HHI in specification 2, the codeshare variable became positive and statistical 
significant, and the interacted coefficient was negative and statistically significant, and 
suggesting potential heterogeneous effects between the proportion of codeshare passengers and 
market concentration. This effect will be explored later in the product analysis.  
The introduction of joint presence variables (specifications 3 and 4) and variables to 
control for endogeneity and non-merger related changes (specification 4) did not substantially 
alter the statistical significance of the codeshare variables in specification 2. The main 
econometric model (specification 4) continued to yield a statistically significant increase in 
prices that was correlated with the proportion of United/Continental codeshare passengers. When 
I interacted this codeshare proportion with the joint presence dummy variable in specifications 3 
and 4, the interacted variable lacked statistical significance, suggesting that the presence of both 
merging airlines as ticketing agents does not add any significance that was not already provided.  
To better understand the applicability of these results in specific types of markets, I 
decided to analyze subsets of the data. First, I looked at markets containing at least 5 passengers 
in both the pre- and post-merger data periods – the results are shown in Table 4. Since nearly 
30% of the markets in the data have less than 5 passengers, and since these markets tend to have 
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large amounts of concentration by sole virtue of the lack of passengers (and corresponding lack 
of diversity in flight options), I wanted to see if a different trend would be observed when these 
markets were removed from the dataset. Ultimately, the coefficients remained largely unchanged 
and no variable lost or gained statistical significance under this specification. I ultimately 
declined to use this specification due to the lack of any appreciable difference in results. 
Next, I looked at markets where more than 80% of passengers flew on either United or 
Continental Airlines prior to the merger, in order to see if the merger’s effects on codeshare-
abundant markets and markets with joint competition would be further pronounced. The results 
for this specification are shown in Table 4. Previous studies on airline mergers have shown the 
merger’s effects to be especially significant in markets where the merging airlines used to both 
simultaneously dominate the market and compete with each other, since the landscape of such 
markets is more vulnerable to changes. Indeed, much of the current focus by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Transportation tends to be on these markets. 
The results indicated higher coefficients and stronger significance for the joint presence variable, 
which would corroborate the need to remain vigilant about these markets. Interestingly, however, 
there was a negative and statistically significant relationship between the abundance of codeshare 
passengers and prices in these markets. In light of the potential effect that market concentration 
might play in the relationship between codeshare abundance and prices, it is likely that markets 
abundant in codeshare products benefit in highly concentrated markets (such as the ones in this 
specification). The same results were observed when I restricted my analysis to markets with at 
least 5 passengers in both data sets. 
While not immediately related to the focus this paper, the estimation results shed light on 
some other aspects of this particular merger that have not been documented and are worth briefly 
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mentioning. While the presence of either (or both) United or Continental Airlines was correlated 
with a statistically significant, albeit very mild, price decrease, the presence of both airlines prior 
to the merger was strongly correlated with a price increase (see Table 4, specification 4). These 
results, especially when taken with the stronger significance observed in markets dominated by 
the merging firms, would corroborate prior research suggesting that it is the markets with former 
joint presence that are especially susceptible to price increases, most likely due to the elimination 
of a competitor. 
The income and population variables were statistically negative in all four specifications, 
suggesting that their decreases are correlated with increases in prices. Population and income 
decreases were likely to reduce both the demand for flights in the market and the amount that 
passengers were willing to spend in that market. While I had initially expected that this would 
result in airlines reducing fares to compete for these passengers, the data suggests that airlines 
are not likely to take such a measure (presumably out of the risk of incurring losses). It is likely 
that population and income decreases profitability in these markets, potentially forcing them to 
increase fares. 
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Table 3. Market-level OLS coefficient estimates, using a modified version of difference in differences. Sample size: 49625 markets 
         
 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
UA/CO Presence 
  
0.0139 0.0111 - 0.0199 * 0.0118 - 0.0254 * 0.0123 
Prop of UA/CO Codeshare Passengers - 0.0145 0.0952 0.8618 ** 0.2886 0.8405 ** 0.2886 0.8300 ** 0.0084 
UA/CO Presence*HHI (pre-merger) 
  
0.0337 0.0135 0.0749 ** 0.0143 0.0382 ** 0.0172 
HHI (pre-merger) 
  
- 0.0420 ** 0.0113 - 0.0420 ** 0.0113 - 0.0569 ** 0.0118 
Joint UA/CO Presence 
    
0.0778 ** 0.0122 0.0925 ** 0.0122 
Joint UA/CO Presence*Codeshare Prop 
    
0.0645 0.0154 0.0115 0.0174 
Joint UA-CO Presence*HHI 
    
- 0.1533 ** 0.0258 - 0.1302 ** 0.0272 
Prop of UA/CO Codeshare Passengers * HHI 
  
- 1.6592 ** 0.4500 - 1.6193 ** 0.4498 - 0.3938 ** 0.1489 
Change in non UA/CO passengers 
      
0.0000 **  0.0000 
Change in non UA/CO HHI 
      
- 0.0254 ** 0.0056 
Change in Income 
      
- 0.1486 ** 0.0371 
Change in Population 
      
- 0.7114 ** 0.1273 
Change in Fuel Cost*Distance 
      
0.0000 ** 0.0000 
Constant 0.1340 0.0015 0.1428 0.0100 0.1428 0.0100 0.1770 0.0112 
R
2
 0.0000  0.0053  0.0077  0.0148  
 
* Significance at 10%  ** Significance at 5%
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* Significance at 10%  ** Significance at 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Market-level OLS coefficient estimates, using a modified version of difference in differences 
 
 
 
Main Model (same as 
Specification 4 in 
Table 3) Passengers>4 
High UA/CO 
Concentration 
High UA/CO 
Concentration, 
Passengers>4 
 
Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
UA/CO Presence -0.0254 * 0.0123 -0.0300 * 0.0099 
    Prop of UA/CO Codeshare Pass 0.0500 ** 0.0084 0.0607 ** 0.0062 -0.3761 ** 0.1887 -0.3076 ** 0.1649 
UA/CO Presence*HHI (pre-merger) 0.0382 ** 0.0172 0.0454 ** 0.0138 
    HHI (pre-merger) -0.0569 ** 0.0118 -0.0724 ** 0.0101 0.1985 ** 0.0485 0.3158 ** 0.0415 
Joint UA/CO Presence 0.0925 ** 0.0122 0.0909 ** 0.0090 0.2156 0.2380 0.3105 ** 0.1932 
Joint UA/CO Presence*Codeshare Prop 0.0115 0.0174 0.0089 ** 0.0127 -0.1360 0.2688 -0.1441 0.2517 
Joint UA-CO Presence*HHI -0.1302 ** 0.0272 -0.1263 ** 0.0195 -0.0329 0.1441 -0.1456 0.1323 
Prop of UA/CO Codeshare Pass * HHI -0.3938 ** 0.1489 -0.3768 ** 0.1489 -0.1339 ** 0.1489 -0.2538 ** 0.1489 
Change in non UA/CO passengers 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 -0.0004 ** 0.0001 -0.0004 ** 0.0001 
Change in non UA/CO HHI -0.0254 ** 0.0056 -0.0146 ** 0.0049 -0.1198 ** 0.0113 -0.1219 ** 0.0099 
Change in Income -0.1486 ** 0.0371 0.0313 0.0348 -0.3447 ** 0.0646 -0.1603 ** 0.0756 
Change in Population -0.7114 ** 0.1273 -0.8366 ** 0.1054 0.1881 0.3710 -0.0886 0.3822 
Change in Fuel Cost*Distance 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 
Constant 0.1770 0.0112 0.1754 0.0093 -0.0073 0.0478 -0.1009 0.0403 
Number of Markets 49625  36201  8221  3979  
R
2 
0.0148  0.0377  0.0261  0.0635  
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PRODUCTS 
A subset of the passenger data was collapsed into 74,750 products. Products that were 
operated by Continental Airlines before the merger were recoded to United Airlines in the post-
merger data for the purpose of matching pre- and post-merger data. Many itineraries that were 
analyzable in the market-level analysis could not be analyzed at the product-level due to 
incomprehensive and unanalyzable information surrounding the operating carrier. This was 
especially true for itineraries where the operating carrier changed within the market. 
Nevertheless, the products that were analyzed constitute a representative sample of those that 
were included in the market-level analysis. 
All of the market-level variables were retained in the product-level analysis, since price 
changes experienced by products are likely to be attributed to the market it is located in, as well 
as characteristics pertaining to the product. The market-level variables remained largely 
consistent with those seen in the market-level analysis. Although there were some minor 
deviations in coefficient magnitudes and occasionally in statistical significance, this can be 
attributed to the fact that the data is being observed on a different level. The estimation results 
are shown in Table 5. 
The most important variable in this analysis was the codeshare variable, which is equal to 
1 if the product was (in the pre-merger period) either ticketed by United Airlines and operated by 
Continental Airlines, or ticketed by Continental Airlines and operated by United Airlines. Other 
product-specific variables were meant to account for varying combinations of potential product 
involvement by the merging firms. Specifications 1 and 3 indicated a lack of statistical 
significance in the relationship between price and products that were formerly code-shared 
between United and Continental Airlines. This was observed when the codeshare variable was 
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viewed without any other variable and when it was not interacted with any variable. However, 
when I interacted the codeshare variable with the pre-merger HHI of the product’s market, the 
codeshare variable became significantly positive while the interacted variable became 
significantly negative in all of the product-level specifications – a result that held when the 
codeshare and interacted variables were the only ones in the estimation (specification 2), and 
when all other variables were incorporated (specification 4). All of these estimations suggest that 
codeshare products in highly concentrated markets experienced price decreases while those in 
less concentrated markets saw price increases, with the effect that the “average” codeshare 
product saw no effect. 
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* Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level
 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. 
Market-level Variables 
        UA/CO Presence 
    
- 0.0234 0.0198 - 0.0150 0.0198 
Prop of UA/CO Codeshare Pass 
    
0.0641 ** 0.0106 0.0598 ** 0.0107 
UA/CO Presence*HHI  
    
0.0541 * 0.0282 0.0380 0.0283 
HHI (pre-merger) 
    
- 0.0997 ** 0.0214 - 0.0995 ** 0.0214 
Joint UA/CO Presence 
    
0.0614 ** 0.0101 0.0478 ** 0.0102 
Joint UA/CO Presence*Codeshare Prop 
    
0.0219 0.0146 0.0297 ** 0.0146 
Joint UA-CO Presence*HHI 
    
- 0.1360 ** 0.0213 - 0.1057 ** 0.0216 
Prop of UA/CO Codeshare Pass * HHI 
    
- 0.3245 ** 0.1489 - 0.3632 ** 0.1543 
Change in non UA/CO passengers 
    
0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 
Change in non UA/CO HHI 
    
0.0629 ** 0.0093 0.0629 ** 0.0093 
Change in Income 
    
0.1696 ** 0.0591 0.1691 ** 0.0591 
Change in Population 
    
- 0.8480 ** 0.1420 - 0.8374 ** 0.1424 
Change in Fuel*Distance         0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
         
Product-level Variables                 
UA/CO Ticket 
    
- 0.0176 * 0.0099 - 0.0323 ** 0.0101 
UA/CO Ticket*HHI 
    
0.0448 ** 0.0196 0.0774 ** 0.0201 
UA/CO Codeshare Ticket 0.0073 0.0078 0.1900 ** 0.0200 0.0129 0.0090 0.1613 ** 0.0212 
UA/CO Codeshare Ticket * HHI 
  
- 0.5103 ** 0.0514 
  
- 0.4215 ** 0.0545 
CO Ticketed 
    
0.0181 * 0.0090 0.0094 0.0090 
CO Operated 
    
- 0.0434 ** 0.0100 - 0.0329 ** 0.0101 
UA Operated 
    
0.0545 ** 0.0058 0.0557 ** 0.0058 
Constant 0.1632 0.0015 0.1632 0.0015 0.1772 0.0182 0.1773 0.0182 
R
2 
0.0000  0.0013  0.0135  0.0142  
Table 5. Product-level analysis estimates, using a modified version of difference in differences OLS. Sample size: 74750 products 
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HETEROGENEITY 
The heterogeneity between codeshare products and market concentration, especially 
when taken with the market-level results that also found heterogeneity between codeshare 
abundance and market concentration, suggests that the effect that market concentration has on 
the prices of codeshare products might be one to further explore. Since the market-level analysis 
revealed a statistically significant negative relationship between market concentration and prices, 
and this relationship was maintained even after the codeshare abundance variable was interacted 
with the market concentration variable, it is likely that the effect of market concentration on the 
prices of that market’s products might be different for products that were formerly codeshared 
between the merging firms than for other types of products.  
To better understand this phenomenon, I looked at the relationship between market 
concentration and prices, separating United/Continental Airline codeshare products from other 
types of products; the results are shown in Figures 2 and 3, as well as in Table 6. I constructed 
two-way plots to examine the effect of market concentration on prices. While statistical 
significance was observed in both linear relationships, the slope was significantly more negative 
for the codeshare products than for non-codeshare products, suggesting that market concentration 
plays a greater role in how the prices of codeshare products are affected than in how non-
codeshare products are affected. Unlike in the non-codeshare graph, there actually exists a point 
where the line crosses the x-axis, indicating that codeshare products with an HHI level above 
0.704 (the x-intercept for the United/Continental Codeshare Product graph, shown in Table 6) 
are likely to see price decreases when the merger occurs and the product becomes a United 
Airline product.  
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Table 6. Product Trendlines for Figures 2-3. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between HHI and price for United/Continental codeshare products. 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between HHI and price for non United/Continental codeshare products. 
 
Trendlines by Product Slope Y-Intercept X-Intercept 
All Products -0.1038 0.2103 2.026 
United-Continental Codeshare Products -0.5103 0.3592 0.7039 
Non United-Continental Codeshare Products -0.0964 0.2070 2.1473 
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6. Conclusion 
Overall, the results indicate that products formerly codeshared between the merging 
airlines experienced price increases in less concentrated markets after the merger, while their 
counterparts in more concentrated markets saw price decreases. Moreover, although markets 
with a higher proportion of codeshare passengers experienced an overall price increase after the 
merger, a decrease was observed in markets with higher amounts of market concentration. This 
finding was observed in the main model, and was corroborated when the data was restricted to 
markets dominated by United and Continental Airlines. 
These results support the hypothesis that the competition between the merging airlines is 
more likely to be significant in markets that aren’t concentrated, and that it loses its significance 
in concentrated markets. As such, the elimination of a competitor in non-concentrated markets is 
more likely to result in price increases, while the opposite effect may be observed in already 
concentrated markets. Codeshare agreements are a form of competition between airlines, 
although airlines don’t necessarily compete against each other in every market. The statistically 
significant negative effect of joint presence markets interacted with market concentration 
provides additional support to this hypothesis. 
The findings presented in this paper are among the first to understand a merger’s effects 
on codeshare products, and to explore the relationship between codeshare products and market 
concentration. As such, they will assist the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. 
Department of Justice in their monitoring of codeshare agreements and in their approval of future 
mergers. Current evaluation methods tend to focus on highly concentrated markets, such as the 
hubs for the merging airlines. The results suggest that they should continue to do so, given the 
overall positive relationship between joint merging airline presence and prices, and given the 
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stronger coefficient for joint presence that was observed in markets highly concentrated with 
United and Continental Airline products. However, the increasing prevalence of codeshare 
passengers and products means that non-concentrated markets should receive more attention due 
to the potential harm to consumer welfare in these markets. 
  
[40] 
 
Works Cited  
 
Bamberger, Gustavo; Carlton, Dennis; and Neumann, Lynette. “An Empirical Investigation of 
the Competitive Effects of Domestic Airline Alliances. Journal of Law and Economics. 
Vol. 47, pp. 195-222.  
 
Beutel, Phillip and Bride, Mark. “Market Power and the Northwest-Republic Merger: A Residual 
Demand Approach.” Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 709-720. January 
1992. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1059837  
 
Brown, Dave. “Analyzing the Effects of Mergers between Airline Codeshare Partners.” Three 
Essays in Industrial Organization: Alliances, Mergers, and Pricing in Commercial 
Aviation. Dissertation. Kansas State University, 2010.   
 
Brueckner, Jan. International airfares in the age of alliances: The effects of codesharing and 
antitrust immunity. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 85, No. 1, 105–118. 
February 2003.  
 
Carbaugh, Robert and Ghosh, Koushik. “United-Continental Merger.” Journal of Industrial 
Organization. Vol. 5, No. 1 (2010). 
 
Chen, Yongmin, and Gayle, Philip. “Vertical Contracting Between Airlines: An Equilibrium 
Analysis of Codeshare Alliances.” International Journal of Industrial Organization. Vol. 
25, No. 5, pp. 1046-1060.  
 
Gayle, Philip. “An Empirical Analysis of the Competitive Effects of the 
Delta/Continental/Northwest Code‐ Share Alliance.” Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 743-766. November 2008. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/595865  
 
Ito, Harumi and Lee, Darin. “Domestic Code Sharing, Alliances, and Airfares in the U.S. Airline 
Industry.” Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. 50, No. 2 May 2007, pp. 355-380. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/511318  
 
Luo, Dan. “The Price Effects of the Delta/Northwest Merger.” Review of Industrial 
Organization. 28 Feb 2013. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11151-013-
9380-1  
 
Morrison, Steven. “Airline Mergers: A Longer View.” Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, Vol. 30, No. 3. September 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20053705   
 
Kwoka, John and Shumilkina, Evgenia. “The price effect of eliminating potential competition: 
Evidence from an airline merger.” Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol 58, No. 4, 767–
793. 2010.  
 
[41] 
 
Peters, Craig. Evaluating the performance of merger simulation: Evidence from the U.S. airline 
industry.” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 49, No 2, 627–649. October 2006. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/505369  
 
Whalen, W. Tom. “A Panel Data Analysis of Code-Sharing, Antitrust Immunity, and Open Skies 
Treaties in International Aviation Markets.” Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 30, 
pp. 39-61. February 2007.  
